Abstract
For much of the postwar era, conservative forces blocked progressive labor policy from reaching a floor vote. With huge Democratic majorities in Congress, the 1960s represented a rare opportunity for unions to substantively alter industrial relations policy. The decade served as an important moment of policy development for numerous groups in the coalition. Organized labor, however, made few gains during this prolific era. Despite labor's central position within the governing coalition, Democrats repeatedly failed to pass its most important legislative ambition, the repeal of Taft-Hartley's right-to-work clause. In 1965, Democrats nearly achieved this goal when such a bill passed the House, only to be blocked by a filibuster in the Senate. By analyzing the Democrats' legislative priorities during the Great Society, I show how coalitional politics structured the party's policy agenda, and how this ordering affected legislation in turn. With the infusion of new coalitional demands, party elites strategically placed labor's controversial issue at the end of a long legislative agenda, effectively eliminating any chance for passage.
Rather than locating all blame with the usual suspects, this rarely studied episode suggests that President Johnson and his leaders in Congress played a central role in the bill's failure.
The Promise and Disappointment of Labor Reform in the 1960s
Lyndon Johnson's 1964 presidential race ended in an unprecedented landslide, and with it, one of the most lopsided congresses of the twentieth century. Democrats possessed huge majorities in both the House (294-141) and Senate . In addition to pure numbers, the overall composition of the 89th Congress gave liberal Democrats a considerable advantage over the Conservative Coalition, the alliance of Republicans and Southern Democrats that operated as a powerful legislative bottleneck throughout the postwar era.
1 Under the banner of Johnson's Great Society, the 89th Congress pursued an ambitious set of issues tailored to new groups in the expanding Democratic coalition. In the first session alone, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act, Medicare, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and a host of regional poverty packages.
As the most organized group within the party, organized labor played a significant role in the electoral success of Democrats up and down the ticket. After the elections, union leaders believed that their demands for labor reform were at last in reach. Indeed, business groups wary of the coming year also echoed the view that unions were due for a good legislative term. Before jumping into the case study, I begin by reviewing recent work on party coalitions and agenda-setting, two literatures that often address similar issues without necessarily speaking to one another. How a party develops and then implements its legislative agenda has received considerable attention in recent
years. Yet, the legislative agenda, in two important works in particular, is often described in very different ways: as either the product of gradual issue evolution, or as a list of policies that the majority party can agree upon. 3 While valuable to the study of agenda change, these existing accounts rarely address the intensity of support, or priority, ascribed to specific proposals during a given session. To appreciate what happens after an issue emerges or understand why the majority party is defeated at final passage, further work must explore these coalitional priorities more explicitly.
Coalitional politics play a central role in structuring the party's priorities, and this ordering directly affects legislation in turn. Parties, I argue, strategically develop the agenda around coalitional issues, and then structure its order to advance the goals of specific groups they most strongly align. 4 Studies that use aggregate measures of attention or roll call votes on a set agenda, however, cannot capture the level of nuance needed for understanding agenda priority. Instead, such anal-yses call for a more qualitative study of coalitional agenda-setting whereby the sequence and priority ascribed to each group's legislative goals are examined more carefully. This approach, though limited in scope, utilizes the agenda's strategic design to infer the party's intensity of support for a given group.
After discussing this idea of coalitional agenda-setting, I then apply the framework to a case study of labor reform during the 89th Congress. For much of the postwar era, conservative forces in Congress ensured that the only bills to reach a floor vote were those that sought to retrench progressive labor policy. Before considering which issues received legislative priority, we must first recognize that partisan elites use the agenda to bolster their political and organizational goals. 7 Seen through this lens of partisan politics, the structure of the legislative agenda takes on a strategic ordering rich with coalitional dynamics and electoral implications. More than any other phase in the legislative process, setting the agenda reveals the tension between balancing the needs of coalitional pressure groups and the reelection needs of its members. As recent work by Cohen et.
al. suggests, parties should not be seen as simple collections of voters and officeseekers, but coalitions that also include "intense policy demanders." 8 Moving away from the electoral stage, Karol expands on this theory of parties in examining why elites change positions over time. Linking the party to these groups, he finds that party elites frequently alter their positions on issues, sometimes quite radically, when signaled by intense policy demanders. To maintain or expand their coalition, parties routinely moderate, switch, and even experiment with how they position themselves. The implications of such policy change are important to understanding which groups enter a coalition, as well as how parties change in response to these groups. But how do we measure changes in the intensity by which the party supports or does not support a given group's policy positions? How does the coalition sort out which issues and groups see their policy enacted? These questions are particularly problematic when considering wellentrenched groups, like labor, that lack a credible exit option from the coalition.
Rather than looking at votes on the House or Senate floor, I propose a more focused analysis of the agenda-setting process. The party's legislative agenda serves as a venue for constant struggle among the coalition's constituent groups, all of which expect their pet issue to take priority.
Despite significant research into agenda-setting, few studies explicitly take policy-motivated groups as the central actors in the process. Using easily count- Crowded Agenda
Alternatively, agenda overlap can be assessed by analyzing the specific legislative proposals that make up the agenda in a given session. Confining the analysis to a more narrow window allows for greater appreciation of the actual order different issues moved through Congress. The sequence of the legislative agenda is an important, albeit overlooked, aspect of policymaking. Whether an issue received a floor vote is sometimes less interesting than when the vote occurred.
Parties have a finite set of resources, particularly time, to advance their interests.
Greater scrutiny should be paid to understanding when an issue is determined to come up for a vote. In addition to reflecting the party's strategic considerations, the timing of the legislative agenda is also relevant to the general ranking of coalitional importance among different issues. For potential indicators of sequential priority, scholars should consider when the issue comes up in the term, whether the bill is close to a recess, and the overall order vis-a-vis other "important," controversial legislation.
The agenda's sequence is more than a mere list of which issues receive a vote, and plays an integral role in shaping a policy's eventual outcome. Agenda-setting, however, often means that some issues are privileged over others, and that some groups receive high priority while others do not. During the 89th Congress, organized labor was one of these losing groups. In the following section, I apply this framework of coalitional agenda-setting to a study of labor politics under the Great Society. To appreciate why labor reform did not materialize during such a moment of Democratic dominance, greater attention must be paid to the strategic decisions made by party elites when crafting the legislative agenda. Whether party members supported the repeal legislation at final passage was, in some regards, less important after the bill received low priority during the agenda-setting phase. While by no means the sole reason for the bill's failure, this legislative delay provided critically important time for the opposition to mobilize against the repeal effort.
Labor Policy in the Postwar Era
For organized labor, the decade following Taft-Hartley's passage was difficult organizationally and politically. Under Section 14b, the statute granting states the ability to pass right-to-work laws, the labor movement fragmented into two spheres: a pro-union North and West, and a collection of anti-union, right-to-work states in the Midwest and South (see Figure 2 ). Despite investing considerable time and more than a million dollars into the campaign, the CIO effort to organize the South, dubbed "Operation Dixie," failed to make any significant progress.
14 When labor began its push in 1946, it faced coordinated opposition of business groups at local and state levels. Individual unions, by contrast, competed with one another as CIO and AFL worked to organize new workers into their separate camps. 15 Without a well-organized South, unions in the North were vulnerable to capital flight. Businesses could cut costs by moving, or merely threatening to move, to states where labor unions were weaker.
In the court of public opinion, organized labor was on the defensive as well. 16 Though primarily targeted at the Teamsters, the hearings marked a noticeable shift in the public's perception of unions in general. In January 1957, before the hearings started, Gallup found that 75% of respondents generally approved of labor unions. As Table 1 shows, pub- a period in which we should expect to see labor legislation not only pass out of committee, but reach the president's desk. 18 The organized working class, a central force in the coalition, seemed poised to reap the benefits of Democratic rule, but instead saw little legislative success.
In the remainder of this paper, I detail how Democratic leaders in the exec- 20 Democrats attempted to invoke cloture, but fell fifteen votes short of the two-thirds supermajority. Party leaders attempted to overcome the filibuster in the following session, but were met with unyielding resistance. The 1965 filibuster was the closest unions ever came to repealing Taft-Hartley's right-to-work statute.
Agenda Priorities in the Great Society
After a resounding victory in the polls, President Lyndon Johnson began his first elected term with even "grander expectations" of the Great Society to come. 21 Despite joining with other Democrats to support the bill, he nonetheless refused to send HR 77 to the Rules Committee until the House took up legislation on racial discrimination in unions. 43 Having assured labor of his support in December 1964, Powell's tactics surprised and angered labor. 44 Normally a strong supporter of labor, Powell used HR 77 as a vehicle for advancing anti-discrimination policy omitted from the previous civil rights bills. When it came to issues of union racism, as Frymer's work suggests, the Democratic coalition was deeply divided. 45 With
Powell chairing the committee, organized labor found its legislative goals receiving lower priority. Following pleas from Democrats, labor leaders, and even the NAACP, Powell finally dropped his insistence on anti-discrimination legislation and released the bill from committee in mid-June. As the longtime minority leader, Everett Dirksen was a crucial voice on controversial legislation. It was often remarked that Dirksen shared a closer working relationship with Johnson than the president's successor in the Senate, Mike
Section 14b Reaches the Senate
Mansfield. 57 Although instrumental in passing Johnson's civil rights legislation, Dirksen was less pliable on a core partisan issue like industrial relations policy.
On policy related to organized labor, Northern Democrats and Republicans were deeply polarized, with Southern Democrats siding alongside the GOP. Yet, even with these ideological leanings, Dirksen was undecided on whether to aggressively oppose the bill in the months leading up to HR 77's vote.
The Dirksen filibuster was not only unexpected, wrote AFL-CIO lobbyist Andy
Biemiller, but"wholly unforeseeable." 58 For much of the term, the opposition believed that if HR 77 was going to be stopped, it would happen in the House, not the Senate. Dirksen's hesitation ended during a September strategy meeting when an addi-tional eight Senators, mostly southern Democrats, joined the filibuster coalition.
In addition to his ideological reasons for opposing the bill, Dirksen came to see the divisive issue as an important opportunity to reunite his base after a session of Democratic success. 61 Although they possessed enough votes to pass HR 77, the Democrats had no way of reaching the super majority necessary for breaking a filibuster. 62 Having chosen to delay the legislation, Democrats had provided the opposition with months to prepare at both the grassroots and congressional levels. The timing of the issue was further complicated by the fact that it reached the Senate just before a congressional recess. With this constraint imposed, the intense and sizable minority defiantly asserted that it would block lawmaking until the legislative break. 63 Had the bill reached the floor earlier, there was a chance that HR 77 would have passed before the filibuster coalition could take root. 
Losing Before the Vote
In publicly suggesting that HR 77 was not a central issue, the Johnson administration signaled that it was unlikely to turn the issue into a major fight. By February 1966, no amount of lobbying by unions or pressure from administration officials could win enough votes to break Dirksen's coalition to filibuster. Without full and early support from Democratic leaders, the bill was defeated before it reached the Senate. Despite its ultimate failure, this understudied episode represented the first time since Taft-Hartley's passage that labor had a viable chance to reform existing industrial relations policy. The Great Society's "lost opportunity" for social democratic progress was not as predetermined as others have claimed. 68 For the first time in decades, Democrats not only controlled the necessary committees but also faced less business opposition by virtue of a strong economy. 69 While unable to break the filibuster, the 51-48 cloture vote that ended the Taft Johnson's Great Society programs offered coalitional benefits that worked well within his larger goals to tackle poverty and racial injustice. Minimum wage increases and other transitory gains, however, are far more politically feasible than the rare opportunity to repeal the Taft-Hartley Act, the top priority of union leaders. 71 By prioritizing other issues, party elites seriously undermined a bill that stood to benefit an important coalition partner and a sizable portion of the electorate for years to come. Rather than reaping the varied benefits from a strengthened labor movement, Johnson spent the next year defending against criticism for his "insincere" commitment to unions. 72 79  81  83  85  87  89  91  93  95  97  99  79  81  83  85  87  89  91  93  95  97  99  79  81  83  85  87  89  91  93  95  97 Instead of using the individual chamber DW-NOMINATE scores, the common space places all legislators on the same scale, thus allowing for comparisons across the House and Senate. By laying the House vote atop the senators' scores, we have a rough picture of how the Senate may have divided on the House bill. The x-axis plots the 1st dimension, the y-axis uses the 2nd dimension. The dashed cutting line shows the 1st dimension ideological midpoint for the HR 77 vote that passed in the House on July 28, 1965 . Observations to the left of the line would conceivably vote aye, while those to right would vote nay. For more on these data see http://voteview.com/dwnomjoint.asp
